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N
onbusiness bankruptcy filing rates have increased almost five-
fold since 1980. This alarming growth was largely the impetus
for the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protec-
tion Act of 2005. The intent of the new law, which went into effect in
October 2005, was to eliminate alleged abuses of the bankruptcy system
and to reduce filing rates. 
In deliberations on the new law, Congress expressed concern about
the underlying causes of bankruptcy. The tools currently available for
analysis leave serious gaps in understanding bankruptcy behavior. While
many studies have sought to discover the causes of the rising filing rates,
they have largely focused on aggregated data over time. This approach is
logical—but ignores the considerable variation in filing rates across
regions. Only by examining the regional differences in rates can we gain
meaningful insight into their causes. 
This article describes a new model of county bankruptcy filing rates.
The model contributes to the current understanding by improving on
some of the approaches already used in other studies and by including a
number of determinants not previously considered. 
Kelly Edmiston is a senior economist in the Community Affairs Department at the
Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City. This article is on the bank’s website at
www.KansasCityFed.org. The author would like to thank Kate Fisher for valuable
assistance in the preparation of this article.
55The first section of the article describes the findings of earlier
studies that looked at rising nonbusiness bankruptcy filing rates. The
second section uses the new model to reveal a number of regional varia-
tions in the underlying factors of the rising filing rates. The article
concludes that homestead exemptions and wage garnishments can be
effective policy levers in managing rising bankruptcy filing rates. It also
finds that social issues—stigma, gambling, and health insurance, among
others—are critical regional factors that may help explain the rising
bankruptcy filing rates. Finally, the article shows that higher levels of
self-employment, another regional characteristic, are associated with
lower bankruptcy filing rates.
I. CURRENT  UNDERSTANDING
Bankruptcy filing rates in the United States vary considerably by
county (Figure 1). In 2000, nonbusiness bankruptcy filing rates in
counties with over 50,000 people ranged from only 0.5 per 10,000
households to roughly 410 per 10,000 households. This section dis-
cusses the factors commonly believed to be responsible for such
variation. Some of the factors are policy levers that can be directly
employed by government to manage bankruptcy filing rates, while
others are social issues that have often been underappreciated in the
existing literature on bankruptcy. The section also examines the poten-
tial role of self-employment in explaining bankruptcy filing rates. 
Policy levers
Two of the main factors influencing bankruptcy filing rates in the
United States are homestead exemptions and wage garnishment regula-
tion. Both factors might be used as policy levers to manage the rising
filing rates. 
Homestead exemptions. Each state has the power to establish a
homestead exemption, which limits the amount of home equity that
must be used to pay unsecured debt under bankruptcy.
1 Individuals in
states without a homestead exemption are entitled to the Federal home-
stead exemption, currently $15,000. In 2005, six states (Florida, Iowa,
Kansas, North Dakota, South Dakota, and Texas) had exemptions that
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were unlimited in value (but limited in acreage; for example, the
exemption might be for 40 acres and improvements). For other states,
the value of the homestead exemption in 2005 ranged from $5,000
(Alabama, Kentucky, and Maryland) to $500,000 (Massachusetts),
with the mean exemption, excluding those with unlimited exemptions,
at $63,527.
Homestead exemptions allow bankruptcy filers to have higher post-
bankruptcy consumption than would be the case in the absence of
exemptions. Because nonexempt assets (such as deposit accounts) are
easily converted to home equity (for example, by selling assets and
paying off mortgage debt), high homestead exemptions offer protection
for all kinds of wealth, not just actual homesteads. Empirical evidence
suggests that some high-asset households move to high (homestead)
exemption states to make such a conversion of assets.
2 But the 2005
bankruptcy law will likely prevent this kind of abuse of the system in
the future. 
Figure 1
BANKRUPTCY FILING RATES BY COUNTY, 
UNITED STATES, 2000
 Bankruptcies per 
10,000 households
 < 56.24
 56.24 to 78.01
 78.02 to 103.49
 103.50 to 140.30
 > 140.30
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Existing evidence on the relationship between homestead exemp-
tion levels and bankruptcy filing rates is somewhat limited and mixed in
its conclusions. Homestead exemptions lower the cost of filing for
bankruptcy. Therefore higher exemption levels would be expected to
lead to higher filing rates, all else equal. Some studies find this result.
Others find just the opposite—that higher exemption levels lead to
fewer bankruptcies. Most studies find no significant relationship
between homestead exemptions and bankruptcy filing rates. 
One explanation for finding that higher exemptions lead to fewer
bankruptcies is that the amount of credit issued to high-risk borrowers
may be lower in states with high exemptions. That is, banks and other
financial institutions likely find lending more risky if borrowers are
offered greater protections in bankruptcy. Less borrowing is, in turn,
expected to be associated with fewer bankruptcies. 
Another possible explanation for a negative relationship between
the level of homestead exemptions and bankruptcy filing rates is that
states with relatively high bankruptcy filing rates may keep exemptions
low to keep the incentives to file for bankruptcy low, and states with
relatively low filing rates may be more inclined to be generous with
exemptions. That is, bankruptcy filing rates may determine exemption
levels. The potentially two-way causal effect can lead to bias in esti-
mates of the relationship between homestead exemptions and
bankruptcy filing rates—a problem existing studies have not resolved. 
Wage garnishment. Bankruptcy laws also protect wages and salaries.
When an individual or married couple files for bankruptcy protection,
the laws protect future earnings from garnishment. The idea behind this
exemption is to give bankruptcy filers a “fresh start” and to give proper
work incentives to filers following discharge. Yet, because of this protec-
tion, wage garnishment often spurs bankruptcy filings. 
Federal law sets a ceiling on monies collected by wage garnishment.
An employer may not garnish any more than the lesser of two amounts:
1) 25 percent of an employee’s earnings, or 2) the amount by which an
employee’s earnings exceed 30 times the federal minimum wage ($5.15
per hour in 2000). Some states provide for even greater protection of an
employee’s wages. Delaware, Illinois, New York, Pennsylvania, and West
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Virginia protect 80 percent or more of an individual’s disposable
income from garnishment. Texas, North Carolina, and South Carolina
protect all wages from garnishment. 
Naturally, the more an individual’s wages are protected from being
legally garnished, the greater is their incentive to file for bankruptcy.
Hence, bankruptcy filing rates, all else equal, are expected to be nega-
tively related to the proportion of wages protected from garnishment.
Social factors
Social factors are also likely to play an important role in explaining
patterns of bankruptcy filing rates across counties. Among these poten-
tially important social factors are social stigma, gambling, marriage and
divorce, health insurance coverage, and the shares of the population
that are disabled and receiving public assistance. 
Social stigma. Declining social stigma has often been suspected as a
cause of the rising bankruptcy rates over the last several years. In testi-
mony before Congress, then Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan
argued that “personal bankruptcies are soaring because Americans have
lost their sense of shame.”
3The effects of social stigma are impossible to
measure directly, but the effects can often be inferred from other empir-
ical findings. 
Bankruptcy filing rates are relatively higher in some areas of the
country than others. These regional patterns, which cross political
jurisdictions and therefore may reflect culture, indirectly support the
idea that stigma plays a role in the determination of bankruptcy
filing rates. 
Age may also reflect stigma. A 1996 study by Visa argued that, in an
era of declining social mores, younger cohorts may view bankruptcy as
less stigmatizing than older groups. The study finds a significant positive
relationship between bankruptcy filing rates and the share of the popula-
tion aged 25-44. Other studies have confirmed these findings.
4 Of
course, age distribution might also influence bankruptcy filing in other
ways—in income and consumption patterns, for example. While
younger people have traditionally filed the bulk of bankruptcy petitions,
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BANKRUPTCY FILING 
AND THE 2005 BANKRUPTCY LAW
Nonbusiness bankruptcies generally are filed under Chapters
7 (Liquidation) or 13 (Adjustment of Debts of an Individual
with Regular Income) of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. Chapter 7
filings accounted for about 76 percent of all nonbusiness bank-
ruptcies in the United States in fiscal year 2005. In the same year,
the proportion in the Tenth District was 86 percent.
Chapter 7 requires the liquidation of nonexempt assets,
the proceeds of which are distributed to creditors according to
a preference system (governed by §726 of the Bankruptcy
Code). Exemptions can include personal property and home-
steads and are determined by either state or federal statutes,
depending on the state. Debts are then immediately dis-
charged, unless they are nondischargeable debts such as
court-ordered payments, student loans, and certain tax obliga-
tions. Almost all Chapter 7 filings are “no asset” cases where
nothing is liquidated, and hence, holders of unsecured debt are
offered no relief.
Chapter 13 allows debtors to keep their assets, as long as
payments are made, while paying creditors—out of future
earnings—a portion of what is owed according to a repayment
plan developed and administered by a bankruptcy trustee (or
bankruptcy court in Alabama and North Carolina). At the end
of the repayment period, which lasts no more than five years,
debtors who have fulfilled the requirements of their Chapter
13 reorganization plan will be discharged from the balance of
their dischargeable debts. 
Perhaps the most significant change in the new law
reflects an effort to steer more bankruptcy petitioners away
from Chapter 7 toward Chapter 13. Under the new law, a
means test determines, in part, whether or not a petitioner is
allowed to proceed under Chapter 7. Specifically, cases in
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state of residence and, after covering necessary expenses and
paying priority debt payments such as alimony, child support,
and taxes, are able to contribute a minimal amount toward
their debts (can make $10,000 in payments over five years, or
if not, have a capacity to pay off 25 percent or more of their
unsecured debt with at least $100 per month) will be con-
verted to Chapter 13. Estimates of the share of cases that
would be affected by means testing range from 3.6 percent to
15 percent. Less than 20 percent of Chapter 7 debtors
exceeded the income thresholds in the new law prior to
passage of the new law.
Other provisions included in the new legislation are aimed
at curbing abuse. For example, the amount of dischargeable
debt attributable to luxury items and cash advances acquired
close to the time of filing is reduced as a means of preventing
debtors from accumulating large amounts of unsecured debt
with the intention of quickly discharging it. Many of the other
abuse prevention provisions pertain to exemptions. The most
prominent exemption in bankruptcy is the homestead exemp-
tion, which allows debtors to exempt either a portion of their
home equity or their residence in its entirety, depending on the
state. The new bankruptcy legislation limits the homestead
exemption to $125,000 if the homestead was purchased less
than 40 months prior to filing (only 17 states have exemptions
that exceed $125,000). Further, the filer must have lived in the
filing state for at least two years or else is subject to the exemp-
tion limitations of his previous state of domicile (where he
resided for the majority of the 180 days prior to the two-year
period preceeding the filing). Finally, the threshold for dismissal
as a result of abuse of the system has been lowered from that of
“substantial abuse” to “simple abuse,” and (debtor) attorneys are
now allowed to be sanctioned for the abusive behavior of their
clients. Some payment preferences and dischargeability rules
also were changed with the new legislation.62 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
the pool is becoming increasingly older. Over the last couple of decades,
the middle-aged have made up a significant part of the increase in filings
(Chart 1). 
Legal gambling. Another important social factor that may affect
bankruptcy filing rates is legalized gambling. Gambling might
increase the likelihood of filing for bankruptcy by raising debt levels
relative to income.
5
Legalized gambling has grown rapidly since the 1980s, spurred by
the introduction of gaming on Indian reservations. Casino gaming in
some form (Indian or commercial) is allowed in 33 states. In 1999,
about $769 billion was wagered in commercial gaming, leading to gam-
bling losses to consumers (or revenues to the gaming establishments) of
roughly $59.4 billion. To put those losses into perspective, they equaled
0.64 percent of gross domestic product in 1999.
6 By 2003, consumer
gambling losses swelled to $72.9 billion, or 0.66 percent of GDP.
7
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Problem gambling increases with the availability of gambling
opportunities. The National Opinion Research Center found that
“problem and pathological gambling” within 50 miles of a casino is
roughly double that of areas within a 50-250 mile range of a casino.
8
Both the geographic pattern and the concentration of private and
Indian casinos across the United States vary considerably (Figure 2). The
heaviest concentrations of Indian casinos are, unsurprisingly, in the
upper Midwest, on the West Coast, and in the state of Oklahoma. The
largest concentrations of private casinos are in Atlantic City; Deadwood,
South Dakota; central Colorado; Nevada; and along the Mississippi
River. Very little gaming is found in the eastern third of the country. 
The substantial variation in bankruptcy filing rates across U.S.
counties might be explained in part by the wide variance in access to
gambling. Empirical studies of the relationship between gambling and
personal bankruptcy, however, are mixed in their findings. Some
studies find the presence of gambling increases bankruptcy filing rates.
Yet most studies find no significant relationship.
9
Figure 2
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Other social factors. Other social factors are likely to help explain
the variation in bankruptcy filing rates across counties. Such factors
include marital status, the lack of health insurance coverage, the
numbers of the disabled, and the numbers of those who receive some
form of public assistance.
Divorce often causes a substantial, immediate, and unanticipated
reduction in income, which may lead to bankruptcy. This relationship
is true for women in particular, who are estimated to suffer a 30 percent
decline in economic status in the first year after divorce.
10 Many studies
of bankruptcy using data on individuals support the idea of a strong
positive relationship between divorce and bankruptcy.
11Thus, the shares
of the population that are divorced are expected to influence county
bankruptcy filing rates. 
Medical expenses often are the straw that breaks the camel’s back in
bankruptcy filing—and medical debt in the United States has become
pervasive. Hospitals and doctors provide about $45 billion in uncom-
pensated care each year, much of which is bad debt. HCA, the largest
hospital operator in the country, for example, reserves 12 percent of its
revenues for bad debt. Tenet Healthcare Corp., the second largest oper-
ator, reserves 11 percent. Not surprisingly, these bad debts often arise
from bankruptcy filings. 
In a 2000 survey of 1,974 participants, one-fourth of the debtors
identified injury or illness as a reason for filing for bankruptcy (Warren
and others). One-third described their medical bills as substantial—that
is, $1,000 or more of their medical bills were not covered by insurance.
A 2005 study had similar findings (Himmelstein and others). It
reported that about one-fourth of the 1,771 personal bankruptcy filers
surveyed identified injury or illness as a specific reason for bankruptcy.
An additional one-fourth had uninsured medical bills of at least $1,000.
In 1999, another study found that households with high medical debt
were 28 times more likely to file for bankruptcy than baseline house-
holds (Domowitz and Sartain). In short, medical bills often play a
critical role in an individual’s decision to file for bankruptcy. Thus, the
degree to which the population is covered by health insurance is likely
to have some, presumably negative, effect on bankruptcy filing rates.
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A related factor is the share of the population between the ages of
21 and 64 that is disabled. This group presumably is more likely to
file for bankruptcy for two reasons. Disabilities often require extra
medical spending, and employment options for the disabled are
often limited.
Another potentially important factor is the share of the population
receiving public assistance. Those receiving public assistance are likely
to have limited access to credit, which should be reflected in lower
bankruptcy filing rates. Further, the availability of financial support
during times of hardship may reduce bankruptcy filings somewhat. 
Entrepreneurship and self-employment
About 70 to 80 percent of new businesses fail in their first year.
Of those that survive, half fail within their first five years (U.S. Small
Business Administration). Such high failure rates might suggest that
entrepreneurs have relatively high bankruptcy rates. In 2004, the
latest date for which complete data are available, less than 2.2
percent of all bankruptcy filings were actually business filings,
according to the U.S. Bankruptcy Court.
12 These official reports,
however, may significantly understate the actual number of business
filings because the self-employed, small business owners, and inde-
pendent contractors are likely to file for personal bankruptcy
protection if they have a failed business (Lawless and Warren). While
official reports put business filings at 2.3 percent of total filings in
2003, in reality as much as 19 percent of all bankruptcy filings that
year may have been due to business failures. Thus, a significant
number of personal bankruptcy filings are business filings, and an
examination of the determinants of personal bankruptcy filing rates
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II.  ANALYSIS OF COUNTY BANKRUPTCY FILING
RATES
A substantial literature already exists that seeks to determine the
causes of personal bankruptcy, some of which is discussed above. But
critical holes remain in the literature. In particular, existing studies offer
only weak inferences about the role of stigma in explaining the decision
to file for bankruptcy or in explaining regional variation in bankruptcy
filing rates. There is also a lack of consensus on the effects of gambling
on bankruptcy, with most research finding no statistically significant
relationships. The existing literature lacks consensus on the effects of
homestead exemptions as well, with some finding positive effects, some
finding negative effects, and still others finding no effects at all. Finally,
many potential determinants of bankruptcy filing rates have not been
considered in existing studies, including small business ownership and
self-employment, a full distribution of ages in the population, disability,
lack of health insurance, and receipt of public assistance. This section
describes a model designed to help fill some of those gaps.
The basic model employed in this study is one of bankruptcy filing
rates per 10,000 households. The units of observation are U.S. counties,
and data are from the year 2000. The emphasis of the study is on the
effects on bankruptcy filing rates of policy levers, specifically homestead
exemptions and wage garnishment laws; social issues such as stigma,
legalized gambling, and other social factors; and self-employment.
Numerous other potential determinants of bankruptcy filing rates also
exist that are not discussed in detail in the article, but nevertheless are
employed in the model (appendix). These variables are mostly factors
that have been analyzed in some depth in previous studies. 
Policy levers
A major aim of the model is to correct for bias that may arise when
estimating the strength of a relationship between variables that poten-
tially affect each other. Two such variables are homestead exemptions
and bankruptcy filing rates. 
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Initial estimates of the effect of homestead exemptions on bank-
ruptcy filing rates yielded no significant impact, a typical finding in the
existing literature. Once corrections were made for the possibility that
bankruptcy filing rates may also affect homestead exemptions, however,
the model yielded a positive value for homestead exemptions. Specifi-
cally, for every one percentage point increase in the share of the median
house value covered by the homestead exemption, bankruptcy filing
rates in the county increased by 0.94 per 10,000 households. (Table A-
1) Thus, an exemption of 100 percent of median house value would
yield 47 additional bankruptcies per 10,000 households in that county
relative to a county where the state exemption is only 50 percent. The
average county had roughly 100 personal bankruptcies per 10,000
households in 2000 (the median had 91), so this would represent a 47
percent increase in the bankruptcy filing rate for the average county.
The model accounts for wage garnishment by including the frac-
tion of state household median income protected from garnishment.
Keep in mind that all but the wealthiest working-age individuals derive
virtually all of their income from wages and salaries.
13 The analysis finds
that the greater the protection given to wages, the lower the bankruptcy
filing rate. Specifically, the number of bankruptcies per 10,000 house-
holds decreases roughly one-to-one for every one percentage point
increase in the proportion of state household median income protected
from garnishment.
Social factors
The results of the analysis also provide more conclusive evidence that
social issues are major determinants of county bankruptcy filing rates.
Social Stigma. Proxies for social stigma used in existing bankruptcy
studies include geography and age. Some studies of individual bank-
ruptcy filings have included the bankruptcy filing rate in the county or
state in which the individual lives, assuming that bankruptcy filing
becomes less stigmatized where it occurs more commonly. The results
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The model in this analysis incorporates geography in two distinct
ways from the literature. One simple difference is that the model
includes variables representing eight separate regions of the United
States. Even after controlling for numerous factors that may affect bank-
ruptcy filing rates across counties, a regional effect persists. Specifically,
otherwise-identical counties suffer higher bankruptcy filing rates in some
regions than in others. The Mid-Atlantic states, the Southeast, and the
Rocky Mountain states have higher rates than the Northeast, Great
Lakes region, the Plains states, the Southwest, and the Pacific Region.
One explanation for such persistent regional differences in a relatively
comprehensive model is that cultural differences, such as stigma, likely
play a significant role in bankruptcy behavior. 
Another more sophisticated measure of this regional effect provides
further support for its relevance in explaining differing bankruptcy
filing rates. The findings from an alternative specification, which is
detailed in the appendix (see spatial autoregressive model), show that a
given county’s bankruptcy filing rate becomes higher as its neighbors’
bankruptcy filing rates rise. The relationship between the bankruptcy
filing rates of any two counties declines geometrically as the distance
between them increases.
In previous studies, the share of the adult population that is young
(say, 25 to 44) has been found to be a significant determinant of bank-
ruptcy filing rates. Again, the idea is that the stigma associated with
filing for bankruptcy increases with age, and therefore youth’s share of
the population may be a proxy for stigma. Rather than focusing on a
specific age group, the model includes the entire age distribution of
each county in the analysis, in part to pick up the effects of stigma. The
results are consistent with this view. Bankruptcy filing rates drop as the
share of the population aged 55 to 64 rises. Inconsistent with this view,
however, is that bankruptcy filing rates increase with the share of the
population that is aged 75 to 84. These results are actually more consis-
tent with stigma being a generational phenomenon rather than a
chronological one (Chart 1).
The model also uses religious adherence, along with geographic
variables and county age distributions, as a proxy for stigma.
14 The
underlying assumption is that different religions have different views
on the acceptability of filing for bankruptcy. The results from the
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analysis of these religion variables strongly support the notion that
stigma plays an important role in determining regional variation in
bankruptcy filing rates.
While clearly not a direct measure of stigma, the confluence of
effects of geographic variables, the age distribution, and data on reli-
gious adherence is highly suggestive of a strong role for stigma in the
determination of bankruptcy filing rates.
Gambling. The model improves upon existing estimates of the rela-
tionship between gambling and bankruptcy in several ways. First, the
gambling measure is based on access. Second, given the mixed results of
earlier studies, the model includes a full set of Indian gaming establish-
ments and includes all counties in the United States. The earlier studies
tended to examine only a subset of states. In addition, some studies
considered Indian gaming establishments but many were likely missed
because the studies only included class III casinos, which provide all
types of gambling. Many other casinos provide “fast-style class II
gaming,” in which substantial amounts of money can be wagered.
Excluding such gambling establishments biases the estimate of the rela-
tionship between gambling and bankruptcy rates toward the common
finding of no relationship. The model in this study accounts for a full
range of gambling activities—from Indian and commercial casinos to
card rooms, race tracks, and state lotteries. 
The results of the analysis suggest that gambling is an important
determinant of bankruptcy filing rates. The further a county is to a
gambling casino, the lower its nonbusiness bankruptcy filing rates.
Adding 100 miles to the distance between the two places results in 4.3
fewer bankruptcy filings per 10,000 households.
15 Counties with legal
card rooms have 11 more bankruptcy filings per 10,000 households
than counties where card rooms are illegal. 
Surprisingly, the availability of race track gambling and a state
lottery actually reduce filing rates, compared to counties without race
tracks and state lotteries. Race track betting is legal in 42 states, while
33 states have state lotteries. So, there is little variation in the data, espe-
cially given that these are state-level variables. It is not clear why the
legality of race tracks and the presence of a lottery would be associated
with lower bankruptcy filing rates.
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Other social factors. The model results also suggest that other social
factors are important factors in explaining county bankruptcy filing rates. 
The marital status of the population is believed to be a significant
factor in the variation in bankruptcy filing rates across counties. The
model considers not only the share of the population that is divorced,
but also the shares that are married, separated, or widowed—relative to
the share of the population that has never married. As expected, the
divorced share is positively correlated with bankruptcy filing rates. A
one-percentage-point-higher share of the population that is divorced is
associated with 7.8 more bankruptcies per 10,000 households, which
is substantial even though county divorce rates are highly concentrated
around the average for the nation. Higher married shares and widowed
shares also lead to higher filing rates, relative to the share of never-
married households; but the difference is much smaller than in the
case of divorced households. Surprisingly, the separated share of the
population is negatively associated with bankruptcy filings, even
though separation is known to cause substantial financial strain. A pos-
sible explanation for this unlikely finding is that people in the throes of
a marital dissolution are less likely to choose to deal with bankruptcy
inconveniences at such a time in their lives. Those who are separated
and in severe financial distress will put off filing as long as possible.
In an effort to account for the role of medical costs in bankruptcy
filing rates, the model includes the share of the county population
without health insurance coverage. It also includes the share of the
population aged 21-64 that is disabled. As expected, bankruptcy filing
rates were found to be higher the greater the share of the population
without health insurance and the larger the share that is disabled.
Specifically, a one-percentage-point rise in the share of the population
without health insurance is associated with 0.9 more bankruptcies per
10,000 households. These shares ranged from 7.4 percent to 24.2
percent in 2000. A one-percentage-point rise in the share of the age
21-64 population that is disabled, which ranged from 5.7 percent to
45.6 percent in 2000, is associated with 1.5 additional bankruptcies
per 10,000 households.
The model results also suggest that share of the population receiv-
ing public assistance is positively correlated with filing rates. This result
is surprising in that public support in times of financial crisis would
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presumably forestall bankruptcy filings. On the other hand, controls
for income, employment rates, and other economic factors are
included in the model, and the receipt of public assistance for some
people (but certainly not all) may reflect poor financial decision
making and little capacity for climbing out of financial messes. More-
over, a large proportion of the population receiving public assistance
may indicate an underlying economic crisis in the county that may not
be picked up by other variables.
Entrepreneurship and self-employment
If entrepreneurs have higher bankruptcy filing rates than wage and
salary workers due to business failures, then higher self-employment
rates should be associated with higher bankruptcy filing rates. The
model includes the share of total employment made up of self-
employed people. Net firm births, which are total firm births less total
firm deaths per 10,000 residents, are included in the model as a
measure of the environment for entrepreneurship in a local area. A high
number of firm births relative to firm deaths suggest the environment is
conducive to entrepreneurship and small business and thus should be
associated with lower bankruptcy filing rates. Net firm births may also
reflect the general business climate.
Both the self-employment rate and net firm births (firm births less
firm deaths) are negatively related to bankruptcy filing rates. A one-per-
centage-point-higher self-employment rate is associated with 4.4 fewer
bankruptcy filings per 10,000 households, on average, which conflicts
with the expectation that higher self-employment rates would be associ-
ated with increased bankruptcy filing rates. Most likely, this result
reflects the generally better financial position of self-employed people
than wage and salary earners, at least for men.
16 Ten additional net firm
births are associated with roughly 2.6 fewer bankruptcy filings per
10,000 households, suggesting, as expected, that greater business
success engenders lower bankruptcy filing rates. 
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Other factors
Empirical analysis requires that the model’s determinants be as
comprehensive as possible. This article has discussed the results of the
model that are the most unique to this study or that represent enhance-
ments of previous work. Several other variables, not discussed but
included in the model, are critical determinants of bankruptcy filing
rates as well. The most obvious of these are variables that reflect the per-
sonal financial situation of the average person in the county, such as
total debt relative to income, revolving debt share of total debt, number
of credit cards and new accounts, and the punctuality of bill payments.
The model’s determinants also included demographic factors, such as
race and education, and variables representing asset choices like housing
and autos. Most of these other factors were found to be significant com-
ponents of the model. 
III. CONCLUSIONS
This article analyzed a variety of potential determinants of bank-
ruptcy filing rates. Homestead exemptions are a substantial
determinant, after taking account of potential causality in both direc-
tions. Thus, the weak relationship between homestead exemptions and
bankruptcy filing rates often found in the existing literature may be
more of an estimation issue than a substantive one. Another important
policy variable, the share of wages protected from garnishment, is a sig-
nificant factor as well. The results support the conceptual view that
wage garnishment spurs bankruptcy filing. Policymakers face a crucial
trade-off in setting homestead exemptions and garnishment laws in that
they must balance consumer protections with incentives. Given the
sizeable effects of homestead exemptions and wage garnishment rules
on bankruptcy filing rates and the importance of homestead and wage
protections for making a fresh start, striking the right balance is a chal-
lenging and continuing endeavor. 
Social factors are also important determinants of county bank-
ruptcy filing rates. The data on religious adherence included in this
study are probably the closest proxy to stigma that has been used in
bankruptcy studies. Further, results from measures of the localization of
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bankruptcy filing rates bring new evidence to bear on the stigma issue,
as well as on related spatial issues. Including the entire age distribution
in the analysis, rather than simply median age, yields more informative
results on the role of age in determining bankruptcy filing rates. 
Proximity to gambling establishments is associated with higher
bankruptcy filing rates. The analysis used a different measure of prox-
imity and provided comprehensive data to help shed light on a still-
unresolved issue. 
The share of the population that is divorced is also a significant
determinant of bankruptcy filing rates. And, as expected, county filing
rates tend to rise with rising shares of the population that lack health
insurance, are disabled, and receive public assistance.
The new bankruptcy law passed in 2005 will likely have some
effect on filing rates by curbing abuses and forcing more petitioners
into a reorganization plan that requires them to pay part of their debts.
This analysis suggests that exemption and garnishment laws should be
evaluated to ensure that consumers are offered some protection and a
fresh start without being given too much incentive to engage in risky
financial behavior that may lead to bankruptcy.
 APPENDIX
This appendix provides details of the model used in the analysis. It
also provides results from additional control variables used in the model. 
The Model
The two-stage model begins with a least squares estimation of












2I. The dependent variable is the level of the home-
stead exemption in 2000, in dollars (E). Virtually all of the
independent variables included in the model (W) were statistically
significant at the 90 percent confidence level or better (Table A-1).
Poorer states, as measured by median household income, the
poverty rate, and the share of households receiving some form of
public assistance, tend to have lower homestead exemptions. States
with populations that are older and states with larger families and
greater shares of males and minorities tend to have more generous
exemptions. Surprisingly, both higher owner occupancy rates and
home values tend to lower exemption levels. The political tenden-
cies of the state do not seem to have a significant effect on the levels
of homestead exemptions. These variables in total explained about
21 percent of the total variation in homestead exemption levels
across states.
In the second stage, for each county, the homestead exemption
variable is equal to the predicted value of the homestead exemption
in the state in which it resides (E ˆ) divided by the actual median


















is the vector of bankruptcy filing rates and X represents the
matrix of other explanatory variables.
Because a generated regressor is used in the second stage, t-statistics are
calculated using bootstrapped standard errors, following Efron (1979) and
as described in Greene (1993). A sample of B = 100 bootstrap estimates
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Intercept - 194.2* - 173.3*
(- 1.892) (- 1.760)
Education (%)
< High School  0.031 - 0.311
(0.124) (- 1.232)
Some College / - 0.507** - 0.182
Associate Deg (- 2.212) (- 0.808)
Bachelor’s or Higher - 0.003 - 0.005*
(- 1.225) (- 1.691)
Age distribution (%)
< 15 0.947 1.144
(0.968) (1.049)
15 – 19 0.377 0.103
(0.332) (0.105)
20 – 24 1.720 0.547
(1.331) (0.388)
35 – 44 - 2.124 - 0.682
(- 1.374) (- 0.450)
45 – 54 - 0.196 0.472
(- 0.177) (0.423)
55 – 59 - 4.551* - 4.685**
(- 1.738) (- 2.069)
60 – 64 - 3.842 - 4.038*
(- 1.366) (- 1.773)
65 – 74 - 1.332 - 0.248
(- 0.872) (- 0.162)
75 – 84 3.970* 3.768*
(1.764) (1.836)





American Indian - 0.733*** - 0.584***
(- 4.526) (- 4.290)
Asian 0.202 - 0.282
(0.358) (- 0.447)
Hawaiian/ 7.307* 5.400
Pacific Islander (1.810) (1.542)
Other Race - 0.480* - 0.068
(- 1.818) (- 0.275)




15K – 25K  1.944*** 2.181***
(3.502) (4.283)
25K – 35K   2.926*** 2.354***
(4.561) (4.027)
35K – 50K 1.872*** 1.327**
(3.240) (2.318)
Income (%) 
50K – 75K 3.144*** 2.192***
(6.962) (4.070)





w/ Public Asst. (2.495) (1.330)
Disabled Pop. 21-64 1.621*** 1.460***
(4.702) (4.340)







Separated - 7.457*** - 5.418***




Median House  - 0.00020*** - 0.00022***
Value ($) (- 3.935) (- 5.760)
Median Costs, 0.034** 0.055***
Owner-Housing (2.424) (4.324)
Median Rent 0.004 0.029
(0.187) (1.401)
Owner-Occup. Rate - 0.839*** - 0.389**
(- 3.516) (- 2.042)
Owner-Occup. 1.021 1.133*
Vacancy Rate (1.374) (1.660)
Owner-Occup. 1.021*** 0.859***
w/ Mortgage (5.846) (5.714)
Mortgage Debt  - 0.003 - 0.013
Share of Total (- 0.219) (- 0.912)
† R-IV represents instrumental variables estimation with regional dummy variables; SAR-IV repre-
sents instrumental variables estimation of a spatial autoregressive model
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively
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Variable/Model† R-IV SAR-IV
Vehicles 
None 0.526 - 0.098
(1.387) (- 0.242)
Two 0.057 - 0.248
(0.127) (- 0.553)
More than Two 1.446*** 0.402
(4.971) (1.458)
Auto Debt 1.016*** 0.828***
Share of Total (3.834) (3.351)
Economy 
Employment Rate - 0.825*** - 0.722***
(- 3.406) (- 2.972)
Self-Employ Rate - 4.402*** - 1.681**
(- 4.261) (- 2.448)
Net Firm Births - 0.257** - 0.322***
(- 2.540) (- 2.911)
Debt management 
Total Debt to Income 0.157** 0.062
(2.065) (0.787)
Revolving Debt  - 0.593** - 0.398
Share of Total (- 2.249) (- 1.503)
Number of Bankcards - 4.655 1.697
(- 0.832) (0.350)
Number of  - 82.25 - 139.88
New Accounts (- 0.487) (- 0.889)
Past Due 1.590*** 1.272***
Credit Bills Index (6.991) (5.531)
Gambling 
Min Distance - 0.043*** - 0.017***
to a Casino (- 5.777) (- 2.703)
Lottery - 2.814 - 11.821***
(- 1.195) (- 5.904)
Card Rooms 10.78*** 4.885
(2.616) (1.347)
Race Tracks - 13.67*** - 3.554
(- 4.835) (- 1.585)
Variable/Model† R-IV SAR-IV
State law 
Homestead Exemption 0.939** 0.253
(2.244) (0.685)
Unlimited Homestead  - 2.354 - 4.706
Exemption (- 0.729) (- 1.610)
Not Subject  - 1.038*** - 0.704***






















† R-IV represents instrumental variables estimation with regional dummy variables; SAR-IV repre-
sents instrumental variables estimation of a spatial autoregressive model
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively





2, … , θ
~
B, are obtained by sampling n observations from Z,
with replacement, and reestimating the model B times. The esti-
mated asymptotic covariance is then
(3) .
Spatial autoregressive model
Model (2) is relevant for the case where (BEA) regional dummy vari-
ables are employed. When a spatial autoregression is employed, the
regional dummy variables are dropped and estimation proceeds as follows. 




D(i,j) is the row i column j element of D, N is the total number of
counties, and di,j is the arc distance between the geographic centroid of
county i and the geographic centroid of county j. Letting ρ be a scalar,










(5) is solved for θ and ρ by the method of maximum likelihood.
Bootstrapping is again used to compute standard errors according to (3).
The parameter ρ is a measure of the degree that the bankruptcy
filing rate in any county i depends on the bankruptcy filing rates of all
other counties, where the strength of the relationship between filing
rates in any two counties declines quadratically with the distance
between them. The spatial autoregressive term estimated in this study is
positive (0.528) and statistically significant at the 99 percent confidence
level, which is indicative of stigma effects: A given county’s bankruptcy
filing rate is higher the higher is its neighbors’ bankruptcy filing rates.
Control variables
Numerous control variables were included in the model that are
not discussed in the main text. These are predominantly variables that
have been analyzed in detail in previous studies. Detailed results for all
variables are provided in Table A-2. The first column of results is for the
model with regional dummy variables, which is an instrumental vari-
ables model estimated using least squares. The second column of results78 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
is for the spatial autoregressive model, which also is an instrumental
variables model and is estimated using maximum likelihood. In both
cases, bootstrapped standard errors are presented.
Economic factors. The employment rate is negatively related to
bankruptcy filing rates, as expected. A one-percentage-point difference
in the employment rate is associated with about 0.8 less bankruptcy
Bankruptcies 
…is associated with per 10,000 households
A 100 percent exemption of the median-priced homestead,  47.0 additional
relative to a 50 percent exemption
A one-percentage-point-higher share of median household  1.0 fewer
income protected from garnishment 
A one-percentage-point-higher share of the population that is aged 55-59  4.6 fewer
A one-percentage-point-higher share of the population that is aged 60-64  3.8 fewer
A one-percentage-point-higher share of the population that is aged 75-84  4.0 additional
A 100-mile-shorter distance to the nearest casino 4.3 additional
The legality of card rooms in the state  10.8 additional
The legality of race track betting in the state 13.7 fewer
A one-percentage-point-higher share of the population that is  1.8 additional
married (relative to never married)
A one-percentage-point-higher share of the population that is  7.8 additional
divorced (relative to never married)
A one-percentage-point-higher share of the population that is  7.5 fewer
separated (relative to never married)
A one-percentage-point-higher share of the population that is  3.5 additional
widowed (relative to never married)
A one-percentage-point-higher share of the population  1.6 additional
aged 21-64 that is disabled
A one-percentage-point-higher share of the population  1.7 additional
receiving public assistance
A one-percentage-point-higher share of the population  4.4 fewer
that is self-employed
One additional net firm birth per 10,000 population 0.3 fewer
Table A-2
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filings per 10,000 households, a change of less than 1 percent for the
average county. Although this effect seems small on the surface,
employment rates across counties varied from 23.8 percent to 84.6
percent in 2000. The mean employment rate was 57.4 percent and the
standard deviation was 7.5 percent, which mean that a county one stan-
dard deviation up from the mean would incur roughly six fewer
bankruptcies than the county with the mean employment rate.
Previous studies have generally included the level of income in indi-
vidual studies or the level of median or average income in aggregate
studies, with a quadratic term in some cases. The results have been
mixed. The models estimated here include the entire distribution of
income, and the results suggest that bankruptcy filing rates likely rise
with income initially (from very low income), drop slightly in the
middle income range, then spike at the $50,000-$75,000 range before
declining steadily with higher levels of income. Very low bankruptcy
filing rates would be expected in the lowest income ranges because there
is little access to credit, and therefore less borrowing. At higher income
levels, bankruptcy filing rates increase with much better access to credit
but relatively moderate incomes. At some point, in the $50,000-
$75,000 range in this model, bankruptcy filing rates begin to decline
with a reduced need to borrow relative to income.
Of course, these results reflect proportions of the population that
are in the various income ranges. The assumption is that these propor-
tions mirror closely the distribution of filers. In fact, Rodríguez and
others (2002), in a study using the 1998 Survey of Consumer Finances,
show that the income quintile with the highest bankruptcy filing rate is
the third quintile, which in 2000 included households with income in
the range of $33,006-$52,272, which is consistent with this view.
17
Nevertheless, county income distributions may reflect other phenom-
ena besides the income distribution of bankruptcy filings. For example,
low-income people may be more likely to file for bankruptcy if they live
in a high-income area than in a low-income area if there is pressure to
“keep up with the Joneses.” 
Credit and Debt. Results suggest that debt loads are an important
factor in explaining bankruptcy filing rates. But measures of access to
credit, such as the number of new accounts and credit cards per capita,
are not statistically significant explanatory factors. Total debt to income
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is positively related to bankruptcy filing rates, but the magnitude is
quite small at less than 0.2 filings per 10,000 households for every addi-
tional point in the debt-to-income ratio. The coefficient on the
past-due index is positive and fairly substantial. A one-unit-higher past-
due index, which ranges from 0.7 to 48.9, is associated with 1.6
additional bankruptcies per 10,000 households.
Homes and Autos. Significant spending on autos is associated with
higher bankruptcy filing rates. A one-percentage-point-higher share of
the population with more than two vehicles is associated with 1.4 addi-
tional bankruptcies per 10,000 households, while greater ratios of auto
debt to total debt are related to higher bankruptcy filing rates in
roughly a one-to-one fashion.
As in existing literature, estimates show that higher rates of home
ownership generate lower bankruptcy filing rates. Specifically, a county
with a one-percentage-point-higher owner-occupancy rate has, on
average, 0.8 less bankruptcies per 10,000 households. However, owner-
occupancy rates across counties are highly concentrated around the
mean of 74 percent. Also supporting the literature is that the results
suggest that home equity is associated with lower bankruptcy filing
rates. Specifically, median house value has a statistically significant posi-
tive coefficient, while the share of owner-occupied homes with
mortgages, controlling for the owner-occupancy rate, is positively corre-
lated with bankruptcy filing rates. The vacancy rate of owner-occupied
dwellings does not appear to affect bankruptcy filing rates. Higher costs
of home ownership are associated with higher bankruptcy rates, but
median rent does not seem to affect bankruptcy filing rates.
Demographics. In terms of race, relative to the share of the popula-
tion that is caucasian, African-American and Hawaiian/Pacific Islander
shares of the population are positively correlated with bankruptcy filing
rates, while proportions that are American Indian, Asian, or “other race”
are negatively correlated with bankruptcy filing rates. The results on the
African-American share of the population are consistent with existing
literature, which has little to say about other races. 
 ECONOMIC REVIEW • SECOND QUARTER 2006 81
ENDNOTES
1In the case of a mortgage foreclosure, proceeds from the sale of the house
would be allocated (until exhausted) first to the transactions costs associated with
the foreclosure, then to the first mortgage, then to the second mortgage. Of any
remainder, only the amount in excess of the homestead exemption would be used
to pay unsecured debt.
2See, for example, Brinig and Buckley (1996) and Elul and Subramanian (2002).
3Cited in Julie Kosterlitz, 1997 (May 3), “Over the Edge,” National Journal,
29(18), 871.
4See, for example, Domowitz and Eovaldi (1993) and Flynn and Bermant (2003). 
5In one of the first formal studies to look at the relationship between bank-
ruptcy and gambling, Tahira Hira found that average annual net income is about a
third lower for gamblers than for nongamblers and that the average total debt of
gamblers is about 19 percent higher than the average total debt of nongamblers.
6Christiansen Capital Advisors, LLC, “The Gross Annual Wager of the
United States 2003.” 
7Author’s estimate.
8The use of the terms “problem gambling” and “pathological gambling”
reflect specifically the criteria set by the American Psychiatric Association. For cri-
teria, see http://www.ncpgambling.org/about_problem/ about_problem_timeline.asp.
9Examples of studies which find that the presence of legalized gambling leads
to higher bankruptcy filings include Nichols et al. (2000) and Barron et al. (2002).
Studies finding no significant relationship include U.S. Department of the Trea-
sury (1999), de la Viña and Bernstein (2002), and Thalheimer and Ali (2004).
10See Hoffman and Duncan (1988). Economic status is defined as the ratio
of average income to needs.
11See White (1987) and Fay et al. (2002).
12Data is available at http://www.uscourts.gov/bnkrpctystats/bankrupt
_f2table_dec2004.pdf (accessed August 23, 2005).
13In 2000, the year of data used in this study, when capital gains were at an
all-time high during the late 1990s stock market boom, those making less than
$100,000 earned 70 to 80 percent of their income from wages and salaries, with
the bulk of the remainder coming from IRA distributions and Social Security.
Thus, for working-age people in that income class, virtually all income comes in
the form of wages and salaries. See Burman and Kobes (2003).
14Data is from Association of Statisticians of American Religious Bodies
(ASARB), Religious Congregations and Memberships in the United States: 2000,
Nashville,Tennessee, Glenmary Research Center, 2002.
15The variable used to pick up proximity to casinos is for each county the
distance from the geographic center of that county to the geographic center of the
closest casino-containing zip code. 
16See Karoly and Zissimopoulos (2004) and Fairlie (2005).
17Data on limits of income quintiles for 2000 are from the U.S. Census
Bureau, Historical Income Tables—Households, Table H-1, accessed November
2, 2005, at http://www.census.gov/hhes/income/histinc/h01.html.82 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
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